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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No. 09-2333
______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
                      
v.
SHAWN SYLVESTER,
Appellant
______________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 02-0250)
District Judge: Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 15, 2010
______________
Before: RENDELL, JORDAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed:  August 20, 2010)
______________
OPINION
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge
Appellant Shawn Sylvester (“Sylvester”) appeals from an order of the United
2States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his motion for a
reduction of sentence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  For the reasons set forth
below, we will affirm.
I.     BACKGROUND
We write solely for the benefit of the parties and recount only the essential facts. 
On April 1, 2003, Sylvester entered a guilty plea, pursuant to a binding plea
agreement under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Specifically, Sylvester pled guilty to Count II of a three-count Indictment, charging him
with distributing and possessing with intent to distribute 1.5 kilograms or more of crack
cocaine.  The plea agreement stipulated a prison term of 240 months.
The Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) that
calculated a United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) range of 292 to 365
months.  The PSR also noted that the binding plea agreement’s stipulated sentence was
the maximum statutory term of 240 months.  Sylvester lodged no objections to the
calculation of his sentence, as it appeared in the PSR.
In July 2003, the District Court adopted the factual findings and the Guidelines
calculations of the PSR, and, consistent with the plea agreement, sentenced Sylvester to a
prison term of 240 months.
In 2007, the Guidelines were amended to decrease the offense levels for crack
    Amendment 706 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, § 2D1.1 (2007).1
3
cocaine offenses.   In response to the amendments, on November 10, 2008, Sylvester filed1
a motion for sentence reduction, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  Section 3582(c)(2)
provides in relevant part: “[i]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term
of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the
Sentencing Commission ... the court may reduce the term of imprisonment ....”
The District Court denied Sylvester’s motion on April 20, 2009, finding Sylvester
was ineligible for relief because he had entered into a binding plea agreement.  The
District Court relied on United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2009), to support
its conclusion.
Sylvester filed a timely notice of appeal.  
II.     JURISDICTION
The District Court had jurisdiction, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise
jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
III.     STANDARD OF REVIEW
In general, our review of a district court’s order denying a defendant’s motion for
sentence reduction is for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 154
(3d Cir. 2009).  Where-as is the case here-a district court rules that it lacks the authority to
order a reduction, however, our review of the legal question is de novo.  United States v.
Sanchez, 562 F.3d at 279-88.
    Sylvester concedes, as he must, that,2
[this] Court has rejected [his] argument holding that § 3582(c)(2) sentence
reduction motions are not available where the defendant entered into a Rule
11 binding plea agreement.  United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275 (3d Cir.
2009).  Nevertheless, for the purposes of preserving this issue for future 
proceedings, if any, Sylvester sets forth his argument below.
Appellant’s Br. 8.
    Notably, Sanchez was decided after Dews, and explicitly rejected the majority3
position in that decision in favor of the dissent.  562 F.3d at 282 n.7.
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IV.     ANALYSIS
Sylvester contends, solely for purposes of issue preservation , that the District2
Court erred by denying his motion for a reduction of sentence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2).  He asserts that this Court should adopt the reasoning of United States v.
Dews, 551 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2008), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit permitted a district court to consider a Section 3582 sentence reduction
motion despite the existence of a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) binding plea agreement.  Appellant’s
Br. 9.
This Court’s decision in United States v. Sanchez, forecloses Sylvester’s request
for relief.   Section 3582(c)(2) relief is not available for a defendant who has been3
sentenced, pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) binding plea agreement.  Sanchez, 562 F.3d at
282 n.7.  Here, Sylvester stipulated to the sentence imposed in a binding plea agreement
under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C), the validity of which is undisputed.
5V.     CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we will AFFIRM the order of the District Court denying
Sylvester’s motion for sentence reduction.
